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U.S. IS SAID TO AGREE WITH HANOI ON FRAMEWORK OF A CEASE-FIRE EXPECTS SAIGON TO ACCEPT SOON

THIEU A QUESTION

Many Think He Can Be Won Over With New Concessions

By CRAIG R. WHITNEY
Special to The New York Times

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Oct. 25 — President Nguyen Van Thieu's vaguely worded rejection last night of a cease-fire in place has left many political figures and diplomats here with the belief that he would still accept a cease-fire soon, but only if Henry A. Kissinger can negotiate further concessions from the North Vietnamese.

The Kissinger negotiations with the North Vietnamese were thrust into an even more delicate and critical stage than usual, they believe, by Mr. Thieu's tough speech last night in which he said that all the peace proposals discussed in Paris so far were unacceptable.

A breakthrough could be prevented, they feel, by a number of factors, including strong measures that Mr. Thieu's Government plans to take against known Communists in the event of a cease-fire.

Ambassadors Briefed

In the war, Communist forces fought a series of small battles with Government troops throughout South Vietnam during the day in what American officers described as an apparent campaign to broaden claims to territory before any cease-fire. [Page 14.]

Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam, after swearing them to secrecy, briefed the ambassadors of six Pacific countries, including the Philippines, Japan, Australia and Thailand, yesterday on the latest peace proposals advanced by the North Vietnamese to Mr. Kissinger in Paris, apparently earlier this month.

From the way some of their

Continued on Page 16, Column 4

WASHINGTON VIEW

Aides See a Truce in Few Weeks, Maybe by Election Day

By MAX FRANKEL
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Oct. 25 — American officials now believe that there will be a cease-fire in Indochina in the next few weeks, perhaps even before election day, Nov. 7, barring a supreme act of folly in Saigon or Hanoi.

The negotiations are still described as precarious and President Nguyen Van Thieu did not authorize Henry A. Kissinger, President Nixon's national security adviser, to arrange the final details. But the South Vietnamese leader is believed here to have no logical alternative and his public position is thought to be mostly preparation for a final acquiescence.

As now planned here by many agencies of government, the cease-fire will provide for military standstill in South Vietnam, under rival administrations.

Bombing Would Be Ended

The major portion of the country and all population centers would be administered by Mr. Thieu and his forces as now deployed. Minor portions of territory and population would be officially recognized as the preserve of the Vietcong, backed by about 145,000 North Vietnamese troops.

The cease-fire would clear the way for an end of all American bombing, the withdrawal of all American troops, including military advisers, and a prisoner exchange.

Various mixed political committees and commissions would then be expected to work out a new political order, leading toward a new constitution and the election of a national legislature, but these arrangements would be designed to reflect the strength of the rival forces. Intense political competition, as well as strenuous "police" actions and guerrilla activities, are expected to continue.

North Vietnam is being pressed by the Nixon Administration to promise to make no further reinforcements to its

Outline of Understanding

New details of the tentative outline of an Indochina settlement became available yesterday. The main points of the settlement would include the following:

Cease-fire—A cease-fire in place in South Vietnam. This would leave the Saigon Government, headed by President Thieu, in charge in most of the country, including main populated areas. The Vietcong, backed by 145,000 North Vietnamese troops who would remain in the country, would continue to control scattered areas. All American bombing and mining would stop and all American forces would be withdrawn, including advisers. There would be a prisoner exchange. Separate cease-fires would be negotiated in Laos and Cambodia. Rules on American and North Vietnamese military aid to South Vietnam would be set. Mr. Thieu has called for withdrawal of North Vietnamese troops but is expected to yield on that.

Controls—Two types of control groups to guarantee the cease-fire in South Vietnam have been discussed. The first would involve mixed commissions of Vietcong, Saigon representatives and neutralists. In addition, an international body is discussed, with France, Canada, Poland, Britain and Japan mentioned as possible members. But above all, the United States, the Soviet Union and China would be expected to back the accords and not provide military equipment that could disrupt the accord. A major Communist violation, such as a new invasion, could be met by renewed American bombing from carriers or from Thailand, Washington sources said.

Political Structure—Mixed political commissions, composed of elements from the Vietcong, the Saigon Government and neutralists, would be set up to work out a new political order during the cease-fire. These commissions would order nationwide elections and see to a new constitution and new government. But the present Saigon Government could probably retain most of the political weight under the new structure.

Timing—Final agreement has not been reached, and many details remain. The United States and North Vietnam are closer to agreement than either is with South Vietnam. But despite Mr. Thieu's public rejection of any sharing of power with the Vietcong, the United States is optimistic that he will join in the accord soon. American sources predict an accord in two to six weeks.

McGovern Asserts Nixon Puts U.S. in 'Moral Crisis'

Charges Abuse of Power

By JAMES M. NAUGHTON
Special to The New York Times

DETROIT, Oct. 25—Senator George McGovern, making his harshest attack on the President, declared tonight that the United States faced a "moral and a constitutional crisis of unprecedented dimensions" because of "widespread abuse of power" by the Nixon Administration.

In a nationally televised address that he described as the most important of his campaign for the Presidency, the Democratic Senator accused President Nixon of having ca-

New Account of Sabotage

By STEVEN V. ROBERTS
Special to The New York Times

LOS ANGELES, Oct. 25—A young California businessman said today that he had been recruited and paid by Donald H. Segretti to sabotage Democratic political rallies and gather intelligence from the party's campaign headquarters. He said that he did not know the precise origin of the money he had received, but that he assumed it had come from the campaign to re-elect President Nixon.

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REPORT BY FRE

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By FLORA LEWIS
Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Oct. 25 — A measure of understanding a cease-fire and a sub-political settlement in V has been reached by Henry A. Kissinger and North Vietnamese negotiator Duc Tho, a high-ranking source disclosed here to

French officials, who consider themselves well informed on the recent Vietnam diplomacy, and that the United States undertaken to make such Saigon accepts the term

There is some discord top French officials estimate on how success United States will be in ing approval by President Nguyen Van Thieu—and fore, how soon the acc be put into effect.

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REPORT BY FRENCH

Washington Believed
Pressing for Thieu's
Quick Acceptance

By FLORA LEWIS

Special to The New York Times

PARIS, Oct. 25 — A wide

measure of understanding on

a cease-fire and a subsequent

political settlement in Vietnam

has been reached between

Henry A. Kissinger and the

North Vietnamese negotiator Le

Duc Tho, a high-ranking French

source disclosed here today.

French officials, who now

consider themselves well in-

formed on the recent swirl of

Vietnam diplomacy, understand

that the United States has

undertaken to make sure that

Saigon accepts the terms.

There is some discord among

top French officials in their

estimate of how successful the

United States will be in hurry-

ing approval by President

Nguyen Van Thieu—and, there-

fore, how soon the accord can

be put into effect.

Communists Comment

A flurry of comment from

Hanoi and the Vietcong charg-

ing that "the Nixon Adminis-

tration does not want peace,"

appeared to rebut French asser-

tions of progress. But the Com-

munist statement, focusing on

what was called American re-

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ton rather than a signal that

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The cease-fire would leave

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Above that level, according

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posed of the three major group-

ings in South Vietnam — the

Saigon Government, the Viet-

cong and the neutralists.

The neutralists, it was said,

would play a most important

role. It was not clear whether

that meant that they would have

more than a third of the posts

on the commission or that their

third would function as referee

Continued on Page 17, Column 1

WASH VIEW

Continued From Page 1, Col. 5

troops in South Vietnam, whose presence there remains unacknowledged. American warplanes would remain in Thailand and on ships in the region to threaten retaliation in case of a massive violation.

The United States and North Vietnam would also work out rules to govern future aid shipments to South Vietnam. No details are available here on this feature, but it is assumed that Washington, Peking and Moscow will stand behind the rules to deprive both parts of Vietnam of a major aggressive capability.

A structure of international supervision of the cease-fire and neutral adjudication of political disputes would be envisioned in the settlement. But Mr. Nixon and his aides are said to be relying basically on what they perceive to be Hanoi's decision to shift the contest for South Vietnam from the military to the political arena.

There are varying estimates in Washington of how quickly all the remaining details could be worked out and how long President Thieu might hold back to delay the cease-fire. He is said to have been slow in preparing his forces for a standstill.

Mr. Kissinger is expected to have at least one more contact with North Vietnam's principal negotiator, Le Duc Tho, in Paris, and perhaps make one more journey to Saigon. But a final accord within two weeks is not ruled out. Officials who expect a delay mention a period of perhaps six weeks.

Mr. Nixon, feeling confident of re-election, is said to be insisting that the election is irrelevant, justifying neither haste nor delay.

No one in a responsible position here is prepared to say that a settlement is assured, but this is the tone of most conversations among officials. They see no issue that would cause Hanoi to freeze up or reverse its acceptance of the basic outline developed by Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Tho.

Good Chance Seen for Thieu

In view of Mr. Nixon's belief in the bargain would give President Thieu a good chance of winning political control over much of South Vietnam, they see no way in which the South Vietnamese leader can long delay acceptance.

Mr. Thieu did not hide his disappointment and reluctance from Mr. Kissinger and other high-level visitors from Washington last week. The South Vietnamese leader held out for continued military action to regain the territories and population, estimated at more than one million, over which he lost firm control during the hard fighting this year.

He was also unreconciled to the idea of ceding sovereignty over various portions of South Vietnam to the Vietcong and curtailing his "pacification" efforts in contested regions that are not securely controlled by either side.

Hanoi Concession Is Seen

But the word is spreading here that the Americans gave him little comfort. They pointed out that North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam and in border regions of Cambodia—now estimated to number 145,000—had been worn down, battered and depleted in the fighting.

The enemy would be no

easier to handle, the Americans argued, after another season of resupply and infiltration from the North.

Hanoi's willingness to let President Thieu administer the territories now under his control was held up to him by the visiting Americans as the critical concession. He could never be assured long-term political success, the Americans argued, no matter how long the fighting continues. President Nixon had promised him a reasonable chance to avoid a Communist takeover, he was reminded, and that chance was now at hand.

How much pressure was implied or overtly threatened in these discussions with Mr. Thieu is not known. It appears to have been made plain that Mr. Nixon will not expend another year of military effort and division within the United States to enhance Saigon's territorial or population control by a few percentage points.

May Have Threatened Break

Moreover, the Americans are said to have expressed the view that Hanoi will never end a war to which it has committed so much without at least some hope, no matter how modest, that its southern allies could gradually gain political influence.

Directly or indirectly, therefore, the United States officials visiting Saigon appear to have threatened a public break with Mr. Thieu or a curtailment of aid to him if he resists too long. In either case, he would probably suffer irreparable political damage in his own country from such a breach.

The statement by Premier Pham Van Dong of North Vietnam that "Thieu has been overtaken by events" apparently had the intended effect of complicating Washington's dealing with Mr. Thieu.

The Americans are said to have told Mr. Thieu that, far from becoming irrelevant, he stood to inherit the larger slice of power from a settlement.

For internal reasons, as well as for psychological pressure on Saigon, the men in Hanoi are expected to celebrate a "victory" in the impending bargain. President Thieu has been advised to do likewise and to show confidence instead of fear of the American withdrawal.

In his public reaction yesterday to the American pressure, Mr. Thieu said a "serious" cease-fire would be possible only if the North Vietnamese troops were wholly withdrawn. But he acknowledged that a cease-fire without such a withdrawal was "unfortunately" likely to occur and he promised vigorous military action to defend it.

Simultaneously, he ordered the preparation of flags with which to proclaim control in contested areas and passed a decree threatening arrest and execution of "Communists."

The Thieu speech was read here as largely a preparation for the cease-fire, despite its over-all negative tone.

Cites Vietcong Demands

Mr. Thieu also cited Vietcong demands that he be deposed and that his followers gain no more than equality in any future political arrangement. American officials say that their package did not involve these conditions and they suspect Mr. Thieu recited them largely to claim a negotiation success when the final settlement is proclaimed.

A divergence in the war aims

of the United States and the Thieu government is now openly acknowledged here. Mr. Thieu is said to want total victory over his adversary and unchallenged control over every inch of South Vietnam.

The American objective is described as an end of the fighting on honorable terms—meaning no more than assurance that Hanoi cannot impose a government on Saigon by force and that rival South Vietnamese forces begin the contest for political power in a system that recognizes their proportions of strength and number.

That is all that American officials familiar with the negotiations claim for the impending settlement, but they insist that no more can be expected from the United States. No amount of American military support can enhance the political skill and stature of the Thieu Government, they say, once a fair structure of competition is created and the threat of invasion is blunted.

The content that if President Thieu, with a million-man army plus his local police forces intact, with an experienced administration and control of most of the country's population, cannot withstand the challenge of the Vietcong and 145,000 North Vietnamese troops through a period of uneasy cease-fire, then nothing will ever suffice.

Deny Deliberate Delay

At the same time, Administration officials are contemptuous of charges by Senator George McGovern and other critics of the war that the settlement now evolving could have been achieved four years ago. Until this summer, after the major North Vietnamese offensive had been repulsed, the Americans say, Hanoi's negotiators had insisted on the virtual destruction of the Thieu Government—a political objective that the North Vietnamese failed to achieve militarily.

The outlines of the new Hanoi position appear to have been offered to Mr. Kissinger at the Paris talks last August, but the course of the negotiations since then has not been revealed here.

Further Meetings Expected

Mr. Kissinger met Mr. Tho in Paris on Aug. 15 and then flew to the first of a series of intense discussions with President Thieu in Saigon. He met Mr. Tho in Paris again on Sept. 15 and Sept. 26 and 27. After a visit by his deputy, Gen. Alexander M. Haig Jr., to Saigon, Mr. Kissinger and General Haig met the North Vietnamese yet again for an unprecedented four days of talks, Oct. 8 to 11. And Mr. Kissinger paid a brief visit to the North Vietnamese in Paris on his way to another meeting with President Thieu, starting last Wednesday.

Further meetings with both groups of Vietnamese are expected, but no time has been set, officials here said. The indications are that these meetings will follow Mr. Thieu's agreement in principle to settle some outstanding details and questions of timing.

The most difficult of the procedural issues is said to be some plan for avoiding bloodshed in disputed areas, when the rival administrations proclaim their control over one area or another in the cease-fire. Whatever the arrangements, a certain amount of fighting and ugly conduct is thought to be unavoidable.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 26, 1972

Thieu Believed Open to Truce If Han

Continued From Page 1, Col. 4

associates have described the briefing, the ambassadors were left with an impression that things might possibly still work out if Mr. Kissinger goes back to the North Vietnamese and they make further concessions. They get this impression from this key phrase in Mr. Thieu's speech, "A cease-fire may come in the near future." The remark was an oasis in a long desert of denunciations of any cease-fire plan that did not lead to the withdrawal of Communist troops from South Vietnam, because of "dark schemes" by them to subvert a cease-fire and use a three-sided coalition government to take over by force later.

This impression was shared by several influential Vietnamese political figures interviewed today.

"What is clear is that there is agreement on the principle of a cease-fire," said retired Gen. Tran Van Don, "but the modalities are still in question. Thieu said in his speech that peace and a cease-fire are 'close' I won't say the contrary."

A well-informed American military source said that it was his impression that a cease-fire soon was not out of the question, but he said, "What we must find out now is what are the political conditions."

The source said he believed that the four corps commanders, Lieut. Gen. Ngo Quang Truong, Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Toan, Lieut. Gen. Nguyen Van Minh and Maj. Gen. Nguyen Van Nghi, would be able to go along with and implement a cease-fire under any foreseeable conditions, but would also be likely to support Mr. Thieu if he insisted on opposing a cease-fire without guarantees of a North Vietnamese troop withdrawal.

The source also said that the commander of United States military forces in Vietnam, Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, had not been asked by his superiors for comment on the desirability of a bombing halt without a cease-fire and that apparently the disagreements between the United States and the Saigon Government over Mr. Kissinger's peace proposals are not bitter enough, at least not yet, to lead the Americans to try to make a cease-fire over the heads of the South Vietnamese.

In his speech last night, Mr. Thieu said "I ask the foreign

press to stop saying I'm the obstacle to peace," and he went to some lengths to characterize the secret North Vietnamese peace proposals as demanding that not only he as President but the presidency and the current constitutional government in South Vietnam be replaced by a coalition, parliamentary government.

"He's trying to get people to back his stand by telling them, 'It's not just me, it's the whole regime that stands in the way,'" said General Don, who is a Senator.

Most of the Opposition politicians who have expressed opinions on the situation today agree with Mr. Thieu that a three-way coalition government including the Communists means eventual doom for non-

Communist nationalists in Vietnam.


One Opposition Buddhist Senator, Vu Van Mau, called in a Senate speech today for Mr. Thieu's resignation, so that a broader-based government could be formed to resist the three-sided formula more effectively than Mr. Thieu can.

A proposal by a pro-Government Senator, Nguyen Van Ngai, for a joint House-Senate declaration calling for withdrawal of all North Vietnamese troops, rejection of a three-way government, and insistence that any political solution in South Vietnam be decided by the people of the South will come up for debate on Friday.

The proposal did not get far in the Senate today. Some senators—Pham Dinh Ai of the Op-

THE SHOW'S ON TONIGHT AT SIX!

Fabulous Arpeja things! The clingy things. Long and flowing affairs. The little bares. Fly-away sleeves. Slinky palazzos. The great jumps. Fluttery ruffles. All the exciting Arpeja things you love: brightly flowered black jersey! A cardigan outlined in black velvet, sweeping palazzo pants and a bold black velvet halter. Acetate/nylon, 5 to 13. Young Innocents by Arpeja, 54.00. See the show, Fab



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position, for instance—said that they were more concerned with President Thieu's speech, which they said did not contain anything new.


Senator Don also observed that what the Communists had reportedly been asking — a cease-fire in place before a political settlement — strongly resembled President Nixon's four-point plan of May 8, the day he announced the mining and bombing of North Vietnam to stave off what appeared to be the imminent collapse of a large part of Saigon's army.

The four points say the bombing and mining will stop when all American prisoners of war are returned and there is "an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina." After that, the

United States would "stop all acts of force throughout Indochina" and "proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within four months," leaving the negotiations on a political settlement to the Vietnamese.

President Thieu observed that until now the North Vietnamese had refused to negotiate seriously in public or in private with the Saigon Government and that, therefore, Mr. Kissinger was serving as an intermediary.

Eventually, he said last night, the North Vietnamese would have to negotiate with Saigon and so would the National Liberation Front—the Vietcong—to settle the remaining political questions.



The commission idea is clearly a compromise between the Communists' insistence of a three-part transition government and President Thieu's refusal to step down or to take part in such a government.

Furthermore, an international control commission would be established to supervise the elections and guarantee the ensemble of political and military accords. It would not be the existing, and ineffective, commission, composed of India, Canada and Poland, that was established by the 1954 Geneva agreements ending the French war with the Communists in Vietnam.

The plan is to convoke a sizable international conference in Paris to set up the new control commission. Since the conference would not have to negotiate a cease-fire or other basic accords, the expectation was that it could complete its work quickly.

It could be convened in 48 hours, one source said, so as to have the commission in being when the cease-fire came into force.

With regard to the new control commission, all sides were said to have agreed that India should be dropped and France added. Canada and Poland would apparently be retained, and Britain has been proposed as a fourth member.

Role for Japan Suggested

Some sources reported that Japan would be the fifth member, as advocated by the Laotian Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, who has been in Paris. The existing commission has responsibilities in all of Indochina; presumably the new one would also have supervisory tasks in Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam.

But the Vietcong spokesman, Ly Van Sau, made it clear at a news conference here that his side opposed the inclusion of Japan. He said it was because of the "role the Japanese Government is playing at the present moment, a less than shining role in this war." He added that the Japanese Government had "always followed the U.S. policy of aggression in South Vietnam, but the Japanese people have been on our side."

Indeed, a responsible French source said that Japan would not be included and that China would be the fifth commission member. If so it would be a dramatic reversal of recent Chinese policy against international policing bodies, but it would assure China continuing involvement in Vietnam.

The commission would operate under the authority of the conference, whose major members would guarantee the peace settlement. The conference members envisioned would be those that took part in the 1962 Geneva conference on Laos, which was slightly larger than the 1954 Geneva conference on all of Indochina.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government proclaimed by the Vietcong did not exist in 1962, but would be included now. The participants then were Britain, Burma, Canada, China, France, India, Poland, Thailand, the Soviet Union, the United States and the Indochinese states—Cambodia, Laos and North and South Vietnam.

Publicly, the French Government made a veiled reference to the advancing diplomatic plans. A spokesman quoted Foreign Minister Maurice Schumann as having told the Cabinet today: "The French Government expresses its hope that at the moment when the

Herbert G. Klein, President Nixon's director of communications, said yesterday he did not expect a cease-fire in Vietnam before the Nov. 7 election.

He gave that answer to a question at Hotel Roosevelt news conference, but he stressed that this was his personal opinion and that he was not "a part of the talks" aimed at a peace agreement.

Asked about charges that the peace effort was designed to help Mr. Nixon's chances, he said such charges were "silly."

perspectives of peace are growing sharp as a result of the courageous efforts of the parties involved, there will be no last-minute difficulties."

The Communists' statements from various quarters concentrated, nonetheless, on warnings that they would fight on to victory if a settlement was not reached. There were renewed accusations that peace reports were a "political trick" by the United States designed to "dupe public opinion."

In the absence of any comment from Washington, the other parties involved were pouring out arguments, each evidently designed to nudge the others. There was no sure measure of how many of the heated words could be taken at face value and how many covered last-ditch bargaining attempts.

The pending American election has created the atmosphere of the last lap of a race to settle the war by agreement.

It was evidently in President Thieu's interest to delay agreement until after the election, when President Nixon might be less eager to push him into a political settlement he clearly does not like.

New South Vietnamese laws providing the death penalty for possession of a Vietcong flag or tract were viewed by Western sources here as preparation for competing with Communist claims of territorial control when a cease-fire comes. There has been substantial fighting in the Saigon region lately and many areas are under dispute.

The Vietcong spokesman here mentioned the law as evidence of "fascist measures so Thieu can prolong the war."

It was in the interest of the Vietcong and North Vietnam to insist that President Thieu was the obstacle to peace and that the test of whether President Nixon seriously seeking settlement was his support of Mr. Thieu.

It was apparently in the interest of Mr. Nixon to confound critics by keeping the world guessing—and hoping.

And France has been interested all along in playing a visible role as peacemaker and welcome friend of all sides.

The parties involved shaped their latest statements and silences to their current tactics.

The Vietcong spokesman was harsh in his condemnation of Mr. Thieu and of the United States for supporting him. But when he was asked the purpose of the weekly session of the four-sided Vietnam conference here tomorrow, he said: "It will be important. You will see tomorrow."

'Decetful Maneuvers'

North Vietnam issued several statements. One, by the Hanoi radio, said Mr. Nixon "was using all manner of decetful maneuvers and measures to create a false veil of peace, perfidiously trying for political purposes to create the impres-

line the path of negotiations to work in a way that would be necessary. Hanoi's delegation here also released a communiqué on military victories in the South attributed to the Vietcong. It was the first time in weeks that Hanoi had issued such a communiqué.

In Paris, the North Vietnamese delegation released an editorial from the Communist party newspaper in Hanoi, Nhan Dan, calling on the population to fight for victory.

The editorial, entitled, "Let us redouble vigilance, let us continue the fight with perseverance and vigor," said that "the Vietnamese people still must endure numerous difficulties and tests, but it is winning and will finish with total victory."

It may have been intended primarily to bolster North Vietnamese combat morale amid

necessary. Hanoi's delegation here also released a communiqué on military victories in the South attributed to the Vietcong. It was the first time in weeks that Hanoi had issued such a communiqué.

Prince Souvanna Phouma, who left for the United States, said at the airport that the progress of talks in Vientiane, where his Government today proposed a cease-fire, "will all depend on what happens in Vietnam—what Hanoi does, the Pathet Lao will do."


The Laotian negotiations, based on the 1962 agreement, which was never fully implemented, aim at re-establishing the coalition government of

rightists, neutralists and Communists that has been accepted in principle.

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